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Europe matters. We know it matters because whenever reference is made to the 
presence of an EU provenance, lay perceptions of a legal provision change. Debate 
shifts to its general economic costs,1 the economic benefits or costs for particular 
individuals;2 how it threatens or reinforces perceptions of nationhood;3 and the 
degree of national political unity or disunity it generates.4 These extra associations 
constitute the cumbersomeness of EU law. They are the added significance or re-
sonance attributed to a provision simply by virtues of its having an ‘EU’ tag. How to 
explain them? They cannot be said to emerge simply by reason of EU law’s imposing 
too high regulatory costs, being culturally insensitive or politically divisive. These 
may be true of individual provisions but there is an inversion of cause and effect in 
such assertions as they beg the question as to the standards by which EU law is 
judged and why these standards are such powerful frames in its evaluation. 
Explanations referring to the ‘foreign-ness’ of EU law are equally unsatisfactory. This 
quality may impose higher duties of justification on EU law but its presence can say 
little about the content of EU law’s associations.  
                                                        
1 D. Chalmers, ‘The Positioning of EU Judicial Politics within the United Kingdom’ (2000) 23 West 
European Politics 169, 188-190. 
2 M. Gabel, ‘Public Opinion and European Integration: An Empirical Test of Five Theories (1998) 
60 Journal of Politics 333. J. Schild ‘National v. European Identities? French and Germans in the 
European Multi-Level System’(2001) 39 JCMS 331; T. Christin, ‘Economic and Political Basis of 
Attitudes toward the EU 
in Central and Eastern European Countries in the 1990s’ (2005) 6 EUP 29. 
3 J. Medrano, Framing Europe: Attitudes to European Integration in Germany, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom (2003, Princeton University Press) Chapters 3 & 9; A. Menéndez-Alarcón, The Cultural 
Realm of European Integration: Social Representations in France, Spain, and the United Kingdom 
(2004 Westport, Conn); C. Kentmen, ‘Determinants of Support for EU Membership in Turkey: 
Islamic Attachments, Utilitarian Considerations and National Identity’ (2008) 9 EUP 487 
4 L. Hooghe & G. Marks, ‘Calculation, Community and Cues: Public Opinion on European 
Integration’ (2005) 6 EUP 419; M. Gabel  & K. Scheve, ‘Mixed Messages: Party Dissent and Mass 
Opinion on European Integration’ (2007) 8 EUP 37. 





Instead, it will be argued that this cumbersomeness can only be understood by refe-
rence to the claims that EU law makes about itself. For, whilst subjects’ under-
standings of how EU law acts on them may be as heterogeneous as the human 
psyche and the legal contexts to which EU law contributes, in all circumstances  EU 
law must perform certain common tasks. It must justify reasons for its presence, put 
forward qualities by which subjects can identify it and seek to bring about changes in 
its subjects’ behaviour.  
To undertake these tasks, EU law must make claims about itself. It must set out what 
counts as a justification; with what it identifies itself and the behavioural ethos to 
which it appeals. Such claims are centred, it is argued, on a European eudaimonia 
which requires EU law is to grant individuals the structures, entitlements, respon-
sibilities and protection to make better and more successful lives for themselves.5 
This idea of self-betterment underpins the justification for any EU legal norm; the 
sense of what any EU legal norm is about and the instruction that EU law provides to 
its subjects to how to handle their lives. The first half of this essay considers the 
distinctive features of this eudaimonia of EU law. It will be argued that not only there 
is a particularly intense relationship between it and EU law but that this eudaimonia 
imposes ambitious and irredeemable demands of EU law. If these elements are shrill 
and exigent, a further dimension of this eudaimonia is that it has not got to grips with 
the tensions and conflicts generated by these demands. For it is characterised by a 
conception of politics, which, it shall be argued, sets irresolvable terms of 
contestation but which simultaneously territorialises and entrenches that contes-
tation, and by a conception of justice, which generates further alienation through the 
restricted nature and formality of its vision.  
This eudaimonia also provides a vision of how EU law is to govern its subjects and the 
entitlements and claims it can ask of them. The second half of this essay considers 
these. It will be argued that EU law’s eudaimonia has led to its providing few 
                                                        
5 The term is first found in Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics. It means happiness as a state that is 
secured by rational and virtuous activities premised on an adequate supply of entitlements and 
resources. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics (1905, transl W. Ross, Clarendon, Oxford), Book  I, 
paras. 4- 7. 
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entitlements whilst making many claims on its subjects.  The need to offer something 
that cannot be offered by national law has led to EU law offering a very limited, un-
evenly distributed number of legal entitlements as most entitlements can easily be 
granted by national law. By contrast, the claim to regulate better than national law 
had led to EU law having to govern the most distant types of risks across a wide 
array of activities. It casts a cold hand across us, requiring us to consider dangers 
which are particularly difficult to gauge and which are thus hog-wired by anxiety. 
A project demanding a lot, directly granting a little and always reminding us of our 
insufficiencies generates the style of reactions described at the beginning. Individuals 
may react by retreating into themselves, asking what is in it ‘for me’ or turning to 
false gods. None of this is to damn EU law. We are maybe condemned to seek better 
lives and EU law is simply a strong institutionalisation of this, which, notwith-
standing these effects, brings many goods when viewed from a distance. But it does 
suggest that a central mission for EU law is not simply to better our lives but to 
mediate the cruelty of this by allowing individuals not just to lead better lives but to 
develop and realise accounts of their lives that they perceive as their own rather than 
set out for them.  
 
2. A European Eudaimonia  
To consider this eudaimonia less abstractly and in more detail, this essay examines 
three 2008 legislative proposals – those on carbon capture storage (CCS), patients’ 
rights in cross-border health care (PR), and the provision of food information to 
consumers (FI) - which were chosen because of their significance and difference.6 
                                                        
6 The first two were mentioned in the 2008 programme as strategic initiatives, EC Commission, 
Commission Legislative and Work Programme 2008, COM (2007) 640, 14. The proposal on food 
information was in the 2007 Work Programme but only put forward in early 2008. It is one of the 
most significant ‘simplifying’ measures. EC Commission, Commission Legislative and Work 
Programme 2007, COM (2006) 629, 32 





The CCS proposal is concerned with the aversion of catastrophe on a global scale. 7 It 
forms part of a strategy to reduce EU carbon dioxide emissions by 30% by 2020 from 
1990 levels. To that end, it is anticipated that twelve large-scale demonstration plants 
will be built by 2015 to ‘capture’ emissions and store them underground.8 The 
proposal is concerned with regulation of these plants. It is about ecological risk and 
Man’s relation to Nature. The risks are heterogeneous - those associated with emis-
sion of CO2 into the atmosphere, but also those associated with the contamination of 
the CO2 and those associated with leakage.  
The PR proposal9 consolidates the case law of the Court of Justice allowing EU 
nationals to seek publicly funded health care in another Member State where such 
care could not be provided within their own within a reasonable period of time. 10  
This pre-existing legal framework sets expectations  so that a central debate in the 
proposal is whether an individual should still have to wait a reasonable period 
before seeking treatment abroad.11 The subjects of the proposal are wide-ranging as 
entitlements are all given to all persons who might be seeking medical treatment and 
are entitled to these as social benefits in their State of affiliation. The substance of the 
proposal is about the conferral of a social right, the right to transnational health care, 
rather than the regulation of ecological risk. Redistributive questions are thus 
strongly to the fore, as something, health care, traditionally considered a collective 
good, unitary and territorial, is unbundled and made a series of individual rights.12  
                                                        
7 EC Commission, Proposal for a Directive on the geological storage of carbon dioxide and 
amending Council Directives 85/337/EEC, 96/61/EC, Directives 2000/60/EC, 2001/80/EC, 
2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006, COM (2008) 18 (CCS proposal). 
8 On this see EC Commission, Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 Degrees Celsius, The way ahead 
for 2020 and Beyond, COM (2007) 2, 5-6. 
9 EC Commission, A Community framework on the application of patient’s rights in cross-border 
health care, COM (2008) 414 (PR proposal).  
10 The most recent case in a long line is Case C-372/04 Watts v Bedford Primary Care Trust [2006] 
ECR I-4325, para 120.  
11 PR proposal, article 6. 
12 The Commission is quick to argue that the proposal will only have a limited effect on the 
organisation and budgets of domestic health care, observing that over 90% of health care needs 
in the EU will be met by domestic systems. EC Commission, Ibid, 8. It quotes the estimates of 
unmet medical need provided by the European Statistics on Income and Living Conditions.. 
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The FI proposal is, in turn, distinctive.13 The substance of the proposal is consumer 
rights with the central innovation being more detailed nutrition labelling require-
ments so that it will be mandatory to declare energy, fat, saturates and carbohydrates 
levels in food.14 Like the PR proposal, it takes place within the framework of a settled 
EU legal background. This is, however, that of detailed legislation with the proposal 
bringing together eight pieces of legislation. Whilst wide-ranging, it grants few, if 
any, directly effective entitlements to individuals. By contrast, extensive responsi-
bilities are placed on the food industry.15 The transnational economic dimension is 
more pressing than the other two proposals with intra-EU trade estimated to account 
for 75% of all food trade within the EU.16  Another feature of this proposal is that it 
occurs in a field – unlike the other two - already governed extensively by EC law 
where national food information laws are considered the exception, and therefore 
may only be adopted if they meet the conditions of the proposed Regulation.17 
How to look for commonality amongst such diversity? It is not unusual for common 
principles to be sought in heterogeneous laws which nevertheless enjoy the same 
formal pedigree. At the beginning of his Clarendon Law Lectures, Justice Breyer 
stated: 
‘The United States is a nation built upon the principles of liberty. That 
liberty means not only from freedom from government coercion but 
also the freedom to participate in the government itself.’18 
 
Whether that is the case for the United States, these forms of liberty do not seem to 
be pivotal to informing and contouring the content of these legislative proposals. 
Instead, all proposals are concerned with securing the well-being of the EU citizenry. 
The CCS proposal’s objective is ‘permanent containment of CO2 in such a way as to 
prevent or reduce as far as possible negative effect on the environment and any 
                                                        
13 EC Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on the provision of food information to consumers, 
COM (2008)40 (FI proposal). 
14 FI proposal, articles 29-34. 
15 FI proposal, article 1(3).  
16 Ibid., 9. 
17 FI proposal, articles 37-43. 
18 S. Breyer, Active Liberty (2008, OUP) 9 





resulting risks to human health.’19 The PR proposal seeks to establish ‘a general 
framework for the provision of safe, high quality and efficient cross-border health 
care.’ 20 The FI proposal is to provide the ‘basis for the assurance of a high level of 
consumer protection in relation to food information, taking into account the dif-
ference in the perception of consumers and their information needs whilst ensuring 
the smooth functioning of the internal market.’21  
It is a particular form of well being that is being sought here. It is neither pleasure for 
EU citizens nor fulfilment of their desires nor securing of their contentment.22 It is 
closer to the Aristotelian notion of eudaimonia - a form of self-fulfilment in which we 
flourish through exercising our human activities.23 EU law becomes something 
enabling its subjects to fulfil their capacities to lead a successful and prosperous life. 
This life is not simply about flourishing but also about virtue as the idea of a 
prosperous life cannot readily be disentangled from that of a good life in the 
proposals.  
The mission, therefore, at the heart of the FI proposal is to enable consumers to make 
more informed choices. Yet the information is not on the addictive qualities of food 
or how it can contribute to hallucinogenic experiences or be made into explosives or 
poisons. It is provided to enable consumers to lead healthy and ethical lives. The 
proposal, therefore, states that the information is a basis for consumers ‘to make safe 
use of food, with particular regard to health, economic, environmental, social and 
ethical considerations.’24 Food choices are not therefore just about the avoidance of 
allergens or salts but also about active contribution to a better society. Moreover, a 
process of identity-formation is to take place in the process. Provision of nutrition 
                                                        
19 CCS proposal, article 1(2). 
20 PR proposal, article 1. 
21 FI proposal, article 1(1) 
22 An accessible and useful account of the literature on well-being can be found in D. Haybron, 
The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being (2008, OUP) 33-37. 
23 Supra n.5 
24 FI proposal, article 3(1). 
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information is seen as central to educating the public in that form and heightening 
awareness of the issue.25   
The PR proposal follows a similar logic. The patient is to be an active guardian of her 
own health shopping around the single market for the best provider. She has both a 
freedom and a certain responsibility to secure the most healthy life for herself. For, if 
she does not, EU law provides no alternatives as to who will take care of it. The 
proposed Directive is therefore, inter alia, concerned to secure her accurate 
information about health care, clarity about the reimbursement rights, appropriate 
standards of care across the Union and administrative rights in her state of affiliation 
which allow her a quick decision to go abroad for treatment.26 It is about enlarging 
the possibilities for EU citizens to secure a healthy life for themselves by enabling 
them to make reliable choices about the quality of care provided for them and 
providing the administrative and financial support for those choices. However, this 
active citizenship does not extend to destabilising the principles on which medical 
care is allocated where the perceived benefit is more contentious. They cannot seek 
treatment therefore that is not classified as a benefit in their State of affiliation, either 
because it is too costly or because its medical efficacy or ethics is challenged.27  
The relationship between carbon capture and storage, an expensive, limited and 
tightly regulated process, and this idea of eudaimonia seems less apparent. Yet scratch 
below the surface and a similar story emerges. It is a technology central to the 
combating of climate change, a priority of the Sixth Environment Action Program-
me.28 This programme seeks to decouple environmental pressure from economic 
growth and integrate ecological protection, balanced social development and eco-
nomic prosperity of sustainable development in which each is valued and reconciled 
with the others.29 The CCS proposal is not therefore about the imposition of some 
eco-centric straitjacket but allowing us to prosper according to received under-
                                                        
25 Ibid., Preamble, alinea 32. 
26 PR proposal, articles 5-10. 
27 PR proposal, article 6(1) 
28 Decision 1600/2002/EC, laying down the Sixth Community Environment Action Programme, 
OJ 2002, L 242/1. 
29 Ibid, Preamble, alinea 6-8. 





standings, albeit adapted to new ecological sensitivities. Its benefits are seen not only 
to be combating climate change but also contributing to the security of energy supply 
and to innovation and competitiveness.30 To be sure, these goods are not 
individualised in the same way as the other two proposals but that is only because 
this proposal is underpinned by assumptions about the operations of the liberal 
market economy. Debates therefore revolve about the effects of this technology on 
individual energy bills and the liability of operators in case of mishap.31 
 
3. The Qualities of European Eudaimonia 
But is not eudaimonia at the heart of all modern government? It may be but eudaimonia 
is not about a politics of affect or politics of happiness. It is about combining a 
politics of virtue with a politics of success in which demands of government, society 
and the citizen are made to be ever better. This perfectionism leads to an escalation of 
expectations of government and of the citizen that will not only never be met but can 
also generate perceptions of breakdown or crisis.32 In national systems, this vicious 
cycle is broken by the crucial distinction between state and government, which cuts 
across it in two important ways. 
First, the distinction enables politics and competition for office to be the traditional 
palliative for the onset of a breakdown as it enables citizens to vote in or vote out 
governments without exiting from the political system of the state. If a government 
fails to meet expectations or the type of better life is too demanding or has too many 
costs, voters try a different medicine with a new government. They still remain part 
of the state, however. The personalisation of the process enables citizens to believe 
that their national political system can deliver a better life over time as it offers the 
regular possibility for political renewal. Yet, as has been remarked for some time, this 
                                                        
30 CCS proposal, 3. 
31 ICF, Analysis and Interpretation of responses from the carbon capture and storage internet 
consultation: Submission to the European Commission (2007, ICF International, London) 12-13 & 
24-26. 
32 D. Haybron, supra n. 22 provides a particularly strong critique at 159-170 
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possibility to ‘kick the rascals’ out does not exist in the same way within the EU 
political system.33 This absence not only weakens political accountability, but, more 
importantly for the purposes of this essay, deprives the EU of the possibility of 
political catharsis with all the possibility for renewal of belief offered by that. 
Secondly, the idea of the nation state carries with it the idea of a ‘community of fate’. 
It is a community of strangers bound by a certain legacy. This legacy may generate a 
set of symbols or values for which citizens are willing to commit considerable sacri-
fices. Equally importantly, it generates a pragmatism by placing citizens in an institu-
tional context which they simultaneously recognise as making them who they are but 
which also requires them to acknowledge limits on what is attainable. Put crudely, a 
British national would recognise the National Health Service as central to British 
political identity. Yet if it is a monument to the British political system, its historic 
under-funding compared to other Western health systems calibrates expectations 
accordingly. Nobody expects a British politician to realise German standards of 
public health care within a term of office. This absence of legacy catches EU law in a 
double bind. It compels it to offer more to compensate for the absence of affective ties 
whilst stripping away the historical context that could regulate expectations. The 
consequence is a heightened dependence on a eudaimonia, which is of a different scale 
and intensity, it will be argued, to the national one.  
 
3.1. European Eudaimonia:  Realising the Otherwise Unrealisable  
The Union competes with other tiers of government for the exercise of legislative 
power and must always show that, by virtue of the scale or imperative of the 
problem, it is best placed to address the problem.34  This competition is legally forma-
                                                        
33 The point was made early on in J. Weiler, ‘To be a European citizen – eros and civilisation’ 
(2007) JEPP 4 495, 513-514. The strongest recent argument on how to hog-wire political 
competition more pervasively into the EU political system is in S. Hix, What’s Wrong with the 
European Union and How to Fix It (2008, Polity, Oxford). 
34 On the strength of this see G. Morgan, ‘European Political Integration and the Need for 
Justification’ (2007) 14 Constellations 332.  See also the distinction made between performance 
legitimacy and polity legitimacy in N. Walker, ‘Constitutionalizing Enlargement, Enlarging 
Constitutionalism’ (2003) 9 ELJ 365, 368-370. 





lised through the duty to demonstrate compliance with the subsidiarity require-
ment.35   This contest is, moreover, a perennial one that takes place not only at the 
moment of adoption of a law but throughout its lifecycle as there is a continual need 
for justification and an ongoing possibility of review.36 The goods realised by EU law 
must therefore be goods that are and continue to be otherwise unattainable by these 
other tiers of government. This is not a simple question of scale in which EU law is 
able, for example, to counter trans-boundary effects in a way not possible through 
unilateral domestic action. EU law must also make a claim that it is ideologically best 
suited to realising this level of eudaimonia. It must show not simply that it is big 
enough to realise certain goods but also that it is good enough to do so through its 
legal and political propensities. Academics refer to the Union as a ‘special area of 
hope’,37 an institutional expression of cosmopolitanism38 or a special place for civic 
solidarity.39  Resonant statements are made in EU mobilising documents about 
realising an unprecedented range, scale and standard of goods.40  
This percolates through to the micro-level in the style of justification and reflexivity 
shown in each of the proposals. The central justification for the CCS proposal is that 
national action cannot secure a sufficiently high level of ‘environmental integrity’. In 
                                                        
35 Protocol on the application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, paragraph 4. 
36 The on-going duty to justify is present in the review provisions attached at the end of most EC 
legislation committing the legislature to revisit the legislation after a number of years. It is now 
present in a more concerted manner in the ‘Better Regulation’ initiative. EC Commission, A 
Strategy for the Simplification of the Regulatory Environment, COM (2005) 535. This has led to 
164 initiatives leading to removal of or Commission proposals to remove 2500 legislative acts by 
the end of 2007. EC Commission, Second strategic review of Better Regulation in the European 
Union, COM (2008) 32, 2-3. 
37 A. Ferrara, ‘Europe as a “Special Area for Human Hope”’ (2007) 14 Constellations 315.  
38 Z. Baumann, Europe: An Unfinished Adventure (2004, Polity, Cambridge);  34-38; A. Giddens, 
Europe in the Global Age (2007, Polity, Cambridge) 233 U. Beck, & E. Grande, Cosmopolitan Europe 
(2007, Polity, Cambridge) esp 6-11. 
39 J. Habermas, The Divided West (2007, Polity, Cambridge) 80-81. 
40 The Treaty of Lisbon amends the TEU so that the Treaty is now to draw inspiration ‘from the 
cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal 
values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality 
and the rule of law’  OJ 2007, C306/10. The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedom seeks to assemble and synthesise fundamental rights and freedoms from an 
unprecedented array of documents - the constitutional traditions and international obligations 
common to the Member States, the TEU, the ECHR, the Social Charters adopted by the 
Community and by the Council of Europe and the case-law of the Court of Justice and of the 
European Court of Human Rights (fifth paragraph of the Preamble). OJ 2000, C 364/1. Perhaps 
most notoriously, the Lisbon Agenda set out in 2000 the goal to be, by 2010, ‘the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable 
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.’ EU Bulletin 3-2000, I-5.  
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other words, there is more faith in EU law to set in play the appropriate ecological 
checks and balances than national law.41 The justification for the FI proposal is not 
simply that it will realise a transnational good, the internal market, but that it will 
also lead to lower regulatory costs for transnational companies and secure greater 
equity between EU citizens through the creation of a floor of consumer rights.42 
Finally, the PR proposal is to establish a new transnational good, cross-border health 
care, which not only operates in a legally transparent framework but is high-quality, 
safe and efficient.43  
The paradigm is not only set at an unusually high level, but EU law is also expected 
to demonstrate acute sensitivity to the heterogeneity of its eudaimonia. Appreciation 
is to be so elevated that EU law both has an awareness of when national laws are 
better placed to realise it and a capacity to incorporate these seamlessly within its 
normative schema. The FI proposal therefore allows national labelling laws to be 
taken for reasons relating to a limited number of public interests but these are subject 
to Community procedures of justification and authorisation.44 In like vein, the PR 
proposal notes that universality, access to good quality care, solidarity have been the 
organising principles of national health systems across Europe. These ‘overarching 
principles’ are to be extended to patients from other Member States but not in such a 
way as to prioritise the latter or act to the detriment of patients in the host State.45 EU 
law’s understanding of its eudaimonia must also be sensitive to its many hues and 
textures. All proposals are therefore subject to assessments measuring their 
economic, social and ecological impacts, which are, in turn, subject to procedures 
                                                        
41 Supra n.., 6. Two other justifications are mentioned, namely the problem of transboundary 
storage sites and possible distortions of competition. The latter is explicitly couched as a 
secondary consideration, however, and the former would only justify legislation relating to 
transboundary sites. 
42 FI proposal, 9-10. 
43 PR proposal, 7. 
44  Additional mandatory national labelling laws may be adopted for reasons relating to public 
health, consumer protection, prevention of fraud and protection of intellectual property rights. 
They must be notified and justified to the Commission. If they are not approved by the 
Commission, the Commission’s draft decision is subject to the regulatory committee procedure. 
FI proposal, articles 38, 42(2) & 49. 
45 PR proposal, Preamble, alinea  12. 





verifying their own quality.46 They are to pursue multiple goods and show sensitivity 
to surrounding goods. Mention has already been made of the CCS proposal, which 
posits itself as not just about limiting emissions, but also innovation and energy 
security.47 The FI proposal not only insists that labelling laws are there to enable 
consumers to take account of a wide array of policies48 but is consistent with the 
Better Regulation Policy and the EU’s Lisbon and Sustainable Development Stra-
tegies.49 In like vein, the PR proposal sees itself as  not interfering with a number of 
other policies (smooth coordination of social security schemes, data protection laws 
or laws on the recognition of professional qualifications) and as contributing to a 
number of others, notably racial equality, e-health and sharing assessments of new 
technologies.50 
To be sure, it might be said that much of this is rhetorical. Little is binding and 
maybe the EU does not mean what it says. Yet even such a sceptical approach would 
beg the question why the EU justifies and identifies itself in this way. It can only be 
because there is a perception that this assuages some extra need. If the response is 
that the polity is weak and therefore must legitimate itself in a particularly shrill and 
urgent way, this still begs the question as to why ‘this way’ was chosen and further 
consideration as to the consequences of the choice of binding EU law so tightly to 




                                                        
46 In 2006 the Commission set up an Impact Assessment Board to monitor the quality of impact 
assessments. For the report of its activities see EC Commission, Impact Assessment Board Report 
for the Year 2007, SEC (2008) 120. The Commission has also subjected the procedures to external 
evaluation, The Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the Commission’s Impact Assessment 
Procedures, Final Report (2007, London) (available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/docs/key_docs/tep_eias_final_report.pdf ).  
47 CCS proposal, 3. 
48 FI proposal, article 3(1). 
49 Ibid., 4. Indeed, read like this, it seems almost as if the CCS and FI proposals are pursuing the 
same regulatory objectives! 
50 PR proposal, 4-6 & 18-20. See also EC Commission, A Community Framework on the Application 
of Patients’ Rights in Cross-Border Healthcare, COM (2008) 415, 2-3. 
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3.2. The Irredeemability of European Eudaimonia   
A feature of such a stringent benchmark is there is no mechanism for setting limits to 
its ambition. The EU can, thus, never be successful enough and consequently the 
demands it imposes on citizens to make their lives better can never be too exigent. 
But there is a further twist. If EU law claims that the goods it seeks to attain cannot 
be realised, it also acknowledges, almost without exception, that they cannot realised 
by EU law alone. Indeed, as the objectives of EU law have expanded, a model has 
emerged in which EU law sets the ends or objectives for a policy regime whilst the 
means involve a wide array of international, EU, national, regional and local laws or 
other policy instruments. The mix can vary, and, because of this it has been subject to 
a wide number of appellations.51 In some cases, the mix is of one of formal EU laws 
and national laws and regulatory procedures. In other instances, EU law does little 
more than set general objectives within which Member States have considerable 
latitude both as to means and as to strategy. These two ends of the spectrum cannot 
be categorised, furthermore, according to the formal pedigree of the instrument. 
There are situations, on the one hand, where framework directives, devolve almost 
complete autonomy about not just ways and means but targets and plans to member 
States.52 By contrast, there are other circumstances, such as multilateral surveillance 
of economic policy, where soft law has been found to be highly constraining and to 
place tight controls on national autonomy.53 
                                                        
51 The formal objectives may be incorporated in directives, framework directives, resolutions, 
recommendations, benchmarks, targets, best practice. The titles for these arrangements in the 
literature include governance, multi-level governance, networked governance, reflexive 
harmonisation, condominium, consortio. All these titles carry differences but significant overlap. 
For categorisations see L. Hooghe & G. Marks, ‘Unravelling the Central State, but How? Types of 
Multilevel Governance’ (2003) 97 APSR 233. 
52 An example is the wide-ranging and important Framework Water Directive whose centrepiece 
is the identification of administrative procedures for river basis management, but leaves 
considerable leeway to Member States as to how this is done and how to realise ‘good water’ 
status. Directive 2000/60/EC establishing a Community framework for the establishment of a 
Community Water Policy, OJ 2000, L 327/1. 
53 See the excellent piece by Schelkle which emphasises how the strengthening of the ‘soft’ 
procedures of multilateral surveillance whilst weakening the excessive deficit procedures 
actually led to a Communitarisation of economic policy. W. Schelkle, ‘Hard Law in the Shadow of 
Soft Law in EU Economic Governance’ (2007) 13 CJEL 705. 





This division of labour in which the EU sets out the telos of a regime and in which it 
is granted guardianship over the ends and commitments of multiple policy fields 
reached a new level following the development of the Open Method of Coordination 
and the Governance agendas at the turn of the millennium. These extended this 
division of labour to policy fields either not traditionally monitored by the 
Commission or ones that lay outside the formal Treaty limits.54 A corollary escalation 
of expectations follows. European eudaimonia becomes unconfined in its demands 
and its dimensions! It sets ever more exacting demands across ever broader swathes 
of public life.  
All this posits a particular relationship between EU law and national law. EU law 
becomes the Superego of public life in Europe. It becomes the benchmark of the 
institutional measurement of all political and economic activity. As such, because of 
the irredeemability of European eudaimonia, it is identified with the identification of 
failure and authoritative condemnation of public life across Europe.  
In many cases, this is a failure of national laws or administration. This may be via 
enforcement actions, multilateral surveillance or peer review. So EU law is typically 
identified as having failed when it does not meet this minimum.55 These processes of 
critique are also applied internally towards all EU law. The critique here is not that 
existing EU law does not seek eudaimonia but that it has done so inadequately. EU 
secondary legislation, therefore, invariably contains procedures for its own review. 
Yet this review habitually involves the paradox of subsequent legislation building 
upon existing law whilst critiquing its failure. The PR proposal follows the structure 
of the previous case law but does so on the basis that the latter is not sufficient to 
bring a general and effective application of the right to provide and receive health 
services, and is not sufficiently sensitive to the specificities of health services.56 The FI 
proposal finds the extensive existing EU legislation on labelling to be piecemeal and 
                                                        
54 On the former see D. Hodson & I. Maher, ‘The Open Method of Coordination as a New Mode of 
Governance: The Case of Soft Economic Policy Coordination’ (2001) 39 JCMS 716. On the latter 
see J. Möllers, ‘European Governance: Meaning and Value of a Concept’ (2006) 43 CMLRev 313. 
55 B. Laffan & C. Shaw, ‘Classifying and mapping OMCs in different policy areas’ New Gov paper 
02/D09,  
http://www.eu-newgov.org/database/DELIV/D02D09_Classifying_and_Mapping_OMC.pdf  
56 PR proposal, 2. 
Damian Chalmers 
15   
labelling to be of limited effectiveness as a communication tool so seeks to remedy 
this by making it more detailed and extensive.57 The CCS proposal is particularly apt. 
Two international conventions have been amended to allow storage of CO2 under 
the seabed.58 There is, in no sense, any acknowledgment that these amendments 
build on the goals sought by these treaties. By contrast, the CCS proposal 
acknowledges the failures of the previous EU legal regime. As reduction of emissions 
to EU targets may not be possible, mitigation options have to be harnessed.59 The 
proposal also states that existing EU legal mechanisms – be they emissions trading or 
waste legislation or integrated pollution prevention and control (IPPC) – are 
insufficient to regulate the risks of carbon capture and storage.60 If this is the 
justification for a special regime, however, it is accommodated within these regimes 
so any CCS plant has to meet waste, IPPC, environmental impact assessment and 
emissions legislation requirements as well as the further ones of the proposal.61 
 
3.3. The Politics of the European Eudaimonia   
A feature of a combination of laws or institutions being harnessed to realise a 
common good is that law acquires a pre-eminent coordinating role. Its coercive 
effects are less salient. Instead, the expectations set by it about roles, relationships, 
commitments and responsibilities of actors are more to the fore. Coordination creates 
its own form of politics. The common good and the tasks asked by it may be 
contested. A vibrant example is the EU’s anti-terror strategy which has a whole array 
of civil society established to police it and curb it.62  A politics might also emerge 
from the coordination generating new vectors and institutional relations which 
undermine traditional checks and balances and legal constraints. The Open Method 
                                                        
57 FI proposal, 5-7. 
58 The Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 
(1972 London Convention) and the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of 
the North East Atlantic (the 1992 OSPAR Convention) 
59 CCS proposal, Preamble, alinea 3. 
60 Ibid.,5. 
61 CCS proposal, articles 29-35. 
62 The current state of play is set out in EC Commission, Revised Action Plan on Terrorism, SEC 
(2006) 686. The most interesting account and critical observatory on this is the Statewatch 
Observatory, http://www.statewatch.org/observatory2.htm  





of Coordination has thus been seen as allowing national administrations to avoid 
being tied down by the usual processes.63 Finally, contestation might take place even 
in the absence of such formal networks. For EU laws provide powerful norms 
enabling and requiring institutional actors to take measures that may background 
other goals or modi vivendi.64 
If politics is a necessary condition therefore surrounding EU law, EU law’s 
eudaimonia has led to its being a politics of unfalsifiable claims. By requiring multiple 
actors to combine to realise stringent long-term goals, EU law renders it impossible 
for the contribution of any actor to be gauged. This both diffuses accountability and 
escalates it exponentially, as the actions of the actors are perceived in everything or 
nothing terms. The contribution becomes something, therefore, which is exposed to 
an intractable claim and counterclaim. Greenpeace and the European Renewable 
Energy Council have, thus, opposed the development of carbon capture and storage 
partly out of concerns about the safety and viability of the technology. They also, 
however, believe the cost of the technology will displace investment in renewable 
energy, and, insofar as it might be subsidised, lead to new fossil fuel developments.65 
Such a claim may or may not be true but will never be tested because it would have 
to be assessed against all the other abatement measures taken within the Union and 
then against the counterfactual of what these might have been without this 
technology. Similarly, the FI information proposal is part of regime designed to lead 
to more informed consumer choices and to healthier lifestyles. Even in a field 
governed so extensively by EU law, there is no information on how many people act 
on the information they read on labels, and the contribution of the latter takes place 
against a context of a blizzard of advertising and multifarious national health policies 
so that whilst, intuitively, labelling appears a good thing its contribution is highly 
uncertain. In terms of goods, all that can be measured in terms of each proposal is the 
                                                        
63 C. Joerges, ‘Integration through de-legalisation’ (2008) 33 ELRev 291, 310. 
64 Most persuasively on how EU legal frames cut across and disrupt national legal practices see C. 
Schmid, ‘Diagonal Competence Conflicts between European Competition Law and National Law: 
The example of book price fixing’ (2000) 8 European Review of Private Law 155. 
65  Greenpeace/European Renewable Energy Council, Energy [r]evolution: A sustainable global 
energy outlook (2008, Brussels) 133-134 
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amount of carbon dioxide stored and the amount of label information read by 
consumers.  
If the politics of unfalsifiable claims permeate all governance regimes, even 
exclusively national ones, EU law adds an idiosyncratic feature. As EU law is asso-
ciated with the telos of any regime, even if others contribute to its ways and means, it 
territorialises these tensions. Whilst it may be difficult to hold individual actors to 
account, it is possible to make general statements about the effectiveness or ideology 
of the overall regime66 and the overall regime is tagged as European Union because it 
contributes to the European eudaimonia, and its overall performance is seen as 
something European for the same reason. Thus, whilst curbing climate change, 
health policy etc are not seen as something on which the Union has a monopoly, it 
enjoys a hegemony over the particularly regulatory route to realise these goods. 
Criticism of this route or this goal becomes constructed, therefore, as anti-European, 
and experience of the disruption and the costs as local.67 It is local constraints and 
controls that are lost; local people who suffer the risks of carbon capture and storage; 
local health services who might lose the capacity to operate under the principle of 
universality. To be sure, there is no a priori reason for this as these are experienced 
across the Union! It is the framing of the politics that makes it so! 
To be sure, this territorialisation in which ideological adversaries coalesce and 
consolidate around European Union and national poles can render political issues 
more salient and more acute.68 However, the mechanisms or containers for mediating 
it or transforming it into innovative solutions are not apparent. Only two routes 
seem available. One is to reform the EU policy in question through participation in 
the EU public sphere. Yet, how realistic is this in a polity of half a billion people with 
many veto players for the majority of actors? It requires them, moreover, to frame 
                                                        
66 E.g. The Lisbon strategy could be said not to have realised its goals or the war on terror be 
criticised for its stance on civil liberties. 
67 G. Teubner ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law and How Unifying Law Ends Up in New 
Divergences’ (1998) 61 MLR 11. 
68 D. Chalmers, ‘Reconciling European Risks and Traditional Ways of Life' (2003) 66 MLR 532, 
558-562. 





their responses in pan Union terms – something that may not be readily accessible.69 
The alternative, because of the principle of the supremacy of Union law, is a 
decisionist logic in which opponents choose whether or not to comply with EU law 
and authorities decide whether or not to enforce it.  
3.4. The Justice of the European Eudaimonia  
The earlier quote from Breyer stated that the United States was not just founded 
upon the principle of liberty but was also a nation. As a political community of ‘free 
and equals’ the nation mediates the relationship between freedom and equality by 
insisting upon the public good securing a balance between the two. It is also 
important for reasons of identification as it sets out a series of claims as to why a 
particular interpretation of the good life with all its benefits and costs should be 
borne by a particular group of strangers at a certain place and time.70 In this regard, 
the absence of a European Demos is significant. This is usually referred to as a form 
of sociological affect, an absence of sufficient belief in European-ness to see good 
reasons to bear significant sacrifices for the benefit of other Europeans.71 Its absence 
is, however, also a failure of the imaginary. The absence of any idea of equivalent 
political community to that of the nation frames and limits the types of claim that EU 
law makes. It limits, in particular, the type of claim to justice it makes and the types 
of community for whose benefit it purports to act.  
An immediate response might be that individual national laws do not justify 
themselves by references to vague notions of national political community and EU 
law is not insensitive to its distributive impacts and has distributive policies of its 
own. The argument is not that these are not present in EU law but that its notions of 
                                                        
69 An example of this is the decision of the Spanish Government not to comply with the 
requirement in Annex I of Directive 2007/23 on the placing of the market of pyrotechnic articles, 
OJ 2007, L 154/1, which requires the public to be at least 15 metres from certain types of 
fireworks. This is felt to compromise the nature of many Spanish festivals, most notably the 
Fallas of Valencia, notwithstanding that there are significant burns injuries in Spain every year 
because of this. It would be difficult for Spain to make a pan Union case here but the issue has 
generated considerable popular feeling in Eastern Spain. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/feb/21/spain-eu-fiestas-fires 
70 On this objection and its refutation see J. Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time: A Theory of 
Constitutional Self-Government (2001, Yale University Press, New Haven) 131-133. 
71 The famous point by F. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (1998, OUP) 8-
9. 
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political community and social justice are markedly different from national ones. The 
starting point, drawn from Durkheim, is that two forms of social solidarity or justice 
are present in national systems.72 These are mechanical solidarity, which is based on 
ideas of kinship and sameness (e.g. religion, ethnicity) and organic solidarity is based 
on the division of labour and notions of interdependence that flow from that and 
which lead interdependent parties to acknowledge mutual claims (e.g. employee 
rights, corporate law, consumer rights). National ideas of social justice and com-
munity rely on a dialectic between these two ideas of solidarity in which institutes 
the idea that there is something that binds a community beyond the division of 
labour and that the latter can never meet all the community’s needs.73 In this regard, 
ideas of nationhood have traditionally played an important role as the central recep-
tacle for ideas of mechanical solidarity in modern societies with legal expressions of 
mechanical solidarity – family law, religious law, criminal law – all being predomi-
nantly governed by national law as these institutions have historically been seen as 
central to nation-building.  
There is simply no equivalent at an EU level. The types of solidarity present in the 
European eudaimonia are centred around ‘organic’ ideas of solidarity generated by 
ideas of interdependence. In the three legislative proposals, those consulted and the 
impacts assessed were those considered to be most strongly affected by the pro-
posals.74 Within the proposals, notions of solidarity are, in turn, informed by the 
relations of interdependence between particular parties. The FI proposal recalibrates 
the relationship between food provider and final consumer;75 the PR proposal that 
between the transnational patient, health care providers and public funders of health 
care; the CCS proposal that between operators and regulators but also, insofar as the 
processes will be governed by environmental impact assessment procedures, the 
                                                        
72 E. Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society (1984, Macmillan, transl. L. Coser, London) 
Chapters II & III. 
73 R. Unger, Social Theory: Its Situation and Its Task (1987, CUP, Cambridge) 1-4. For a critique see 
M. Halberstam, Totalitarianism and the Modern Conception of Politics (1999, Yale University 
Press, New Haven-London) 22-26. 
74 For the impact assessment of the three proposals see 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/cia_2008_en.htm 
75 The proposal therefore states that the Regulation shall provide ‘the basis for the assurance of a 
high level of consumer protection in relation to food information’ FI proposal, article 1(1). 





public affected by the development.76 The conception of justice as a form of quid pro 
quo is reflected in the policing of these regimes in which the central redress is 
restitutionary.  Both the PR and CCS proposals rely on liability schemes. The PR pro-
posal requires patients to have the possibility of making complaints and receiving 
compensation when they suffer harm from healthcare.77 The CCS proposal provides 
for the extension of the environmental liability regime in Directive 2004/35/EC to 
apply to carbon capture and storage.78 The FI proposal provides for no sanctions for 
non-compliance but does leave open the possibility that any contract would be void 
as a result of non-compliance and any harm suffered subject to redress under the 
Product Liability Directive.79 
A feature of such solidarity is the formalism of its ties, with considerable attention to 
the effects of EU legislation on other interdependencies. The FI proposal therefore 
provides for special national regimes to continue to apply with regard to non-
prepacked food, milk in glass bottles and most alcoholic beverages because it is 
accepted that it is either extremely disruptive and in some cases impracticable to 
impose labelling rules on these or that other effectives means of imparting 
information have developed.80 Likewise, food operators below a certain size have 
been given additional two years to implement some of the proposal’s requirement in 
acknowledgment of the latter’s regulatory cost.81  
This vision is narrow by virtue of its lack of affect. It has no regard to the feelings or 
symbols that might generate empathy or a sense of common enterprise. It cannot 
explain why EU citizens in one region should feel a commitment to marginalised 
groups in geographically distant regions within or beyond the Union. It is narrow in 
another sense. Solidarity is conceived in highly individualistic terms.  The PR 
                                                        
76 The requirements of environmental impact assessment are incorporated in CCS proposal, 
article 29. The duties of consultation are established in Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment 
of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, OJ 1985, L 175/40, 
Article 6(2). 
77 PR proposal, article 5(1)(d). 
78 CCS proposal, article 33. 
79 See in particular the test of strict liability for damage caused from defective products in 
Directive 85/374/EC on the approximation of laws concerning liability for defective products, OJ 
1985, L 210/29, article 1. 
80 FI proposal, articles 39-41. 
81 FI proposal, article 53. 
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proposal refers to the ‘patient’ as a holder of entitlements82 and the FI proposal is 
premised on the notion of the ‘average consumer’.83 This individualisation leads both 
to a disaggregation in which the private and the public are put on the same footing 
and to an assimilation in which insensitivity is shown either to context or to 
differences in resources, endowments or capacities. Solidarity is levelled down in all 
this and shorn of its hue and seductive appeal. Equally importantly, it is denuded of 
its creative and reflexive dimensions. For a feature of many forms of solidarity is an 
ongoing concern with the insufficiency of current arrangements to respond fully to 
the needs and desires of everybody, in which attention is focused recurringly not just 
on what is being distributed but on the singularity of different actors and their 
claims.84 
 
4. The Claims of European Eudaimonia 
The traits described in the previous section of the eudaimonia through which EU law 
is identified and justified tell us little about how EU law is to realise this eudaimonia. 
Yet EU law does not just set out a resonant picture of the good life. It is also a 
regulatory institution which seeks to secure it. This entails that legal instruments 
must be configured and coordinated in such a way that they do not just recognise 
this eudaimonia but organise and direct behaviour towards it. This in turn generates 
those microprocesses which govern how EU law is experienced - the types of claim 
made on individuals; the entitlements, responsibilities and powers granted; and the 
form of rule generated. 
 
 
                                                        
82 PR proposal, article 4(f).Its definition excludes those who do not travel abroad for treatment! 
83 FI proposal, Preamble, alinea 38. 
84 The work of Axel Honneth therefore sees a commitment to symmetrical esteem in which the 
traits and values of each are symmetrically solidarity as a pre-requisite for solidarity.  A. 
Honneth, Struggle for Recognition. The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts ( 1995. Polity, Oxford) 
Chapter 5. 





4.1. A Narrow Range of Entitlements 
EU laws may benefit wide numbers of people but a feature of EU law is that it gives 
a very narrow range of positive entitlements which can be directly invoked and are 
actively invoked by its subjects. The following central entitlements are set out in the 
three proposals.  
• The CCS procedure grants, subject to permits, operators the possibility to 
explore sits for carbon capture and storage and to store carbon dioxide at 
suitable sites.85  
• The PR proposal grants persons covered by an EU public health scheme the 
entitlement to go to another Member State for health care for something that 
is covered as a benefit by the legislation in their State of affiliation, and to 
have a number of procedural and substantive rights associated with that.86   
• The FI proposal proposes mandatory food information for consumers on the 
identity and composition of the food, on protection of consumer’s health and 
safe use and on the food’s nutritional characteristics.87  
The CCS proposal is self-avowedly for a small number – twelve – of capital intensive 
installations who have the capacity to install, supervise and maintain costly and 
complicated technology. If the other two proposals seem wide-ranging insofar as 
they affect patients and consumers of food, the picture changes when one looks at 
the actual exercise of entitlements. With regard to food labelling, the number of 
consumers who look at labels is high and increasing. Most studies suggest that it is 
more than half of all consumers. More detailed studies, however, have suggested 
that self-reporting has exaggerated the extent to which consumers read labels with 
observational studies suggesting that the proportion of consumers who actually 
study labels rather than glance at ‘sell by dates’ being less than 20%. Whilst there is 
                                                        
85 CCS proposal, articles 5 & 8. 
86 PR proposal, article 6(1). These include, in the state of treatment, protection of personal data, 
equal treatment with that State’s own nationals, information that will enable them to make an 
informed choice about the procedure; possibilities for complaints and remedies in the case of 
harm. Ibid., article 5(1).  
87 FI proposal, article 4(1) & article 6. 
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no research on the number of the consumers acting on the labels, one study suggests 
only 1% read and understand nutritional information on labels – the central reform 
of the FI proposal.88 The PR proposal is similar. The Commission is eager to minimise 
the resource implications, suggesting that very few individuals will exercise this 
transnational right. It notes that transnational care currently only accounts for about 
1% of national health care budgets and that 90% of patient needs can be met through 
domestic systems.89 To be sure, there is no comprehensive or reliable data on this.90 
Qualitative research suggests, however, that the patients who exercise their rights 
under the post Kohll case law to publicly funded health care abroad did so usually 
where they were both certified as fit to travel and for a narrow range of highly 
specialised health care.91 
This all begs the question whether there is selection bias here. After all, it is possible 
to think of EU law entitlements that are widely distributed and reasonably egali-
tarian. EU labour law is the most obvious example, but VAT law might be another. 
Yet, if the diffuse benefits of EU law might be more widely spread, it does seem that 
the direct grant of entitlements is narrow and highly contested. Highly dated 
research by myself has suggested very little EU law is invoked in British courts. By 
the end of 1998, just 5 Directives accounted for 73% of the instances in which 
Directives were invoked before British courts. Litigation was focused, furthermore, 
in a very narrow area of EC law.  Five sectors accounted for 61% of all the cases, and 
large policy areas, such as the single market, financial services, company law, 
consumer law, environmental law were marked by little or no litigation. Only 32.6% 
of EC litigation involved disputes between private parties, with two instruments, the 
                                                        
88  It was thus stated ‘Consumers reported that they did understand the terms ‘fat’, 
‘calories/kilocalories’, ‘sugar’, ‘vitamins’ and ‘salt’. The concepts and terms reported as least well 
understood were the relationship between calories and energy; sodium and salt; sugar and 
carbohydrate; and the terms cholesterol and fatty acids. Consumers had difficulty in 
understanding the role that different nutrients mentioned on labels played in their diet. They also 
had difficulty converting information from g per 100 g to g per serving and serving size 
information also proved difficult to interpret...’ G. Cowburn & L. Stockley, ‘Consumer 
understanding and the use of nutrition labelling: a review’ (2005) 8 Public Health Nutrition 21,23. 
89 PR proposal, 8. 
90 European Commission, High Level Group on Health Services and Medical Care (2006, DG Health 
and Consumer Protection)  6 
91 M. Rosenmöller, M. McKee & R. Baeten (eds.) Patient Mobility in the European Union: Learning 
from Experience (2006, European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, Brussels) esp. at 
180. 





Sex Discrimination and the TUPE Directives, accounting for 64.5% of these 
instances.92  
The reason for this derives from EU law’s eudaimonia having to secure goods not 
realisable by domestic action alone. Most entitlements can simply be granted 
through national law. The only reason for the grant of EU legal entitlements is when 
these would realise some new transnational good. This may take the form of some 
transnational right (e.g. transnational health care) or the incidence of some collective 
good, which, as a collective good, rarely depends on litigation to be realised.  
In other instances, the justification for EU legal involvement involves either a 
deontological claim – it is good just because it is – or a claim that EU law knows 
better how to recognise and realise an existing good than national procedures. Yet 
both arguments are ones that are only politically sustainable in the most exceptional 
circumstances, and cannot be used to justify a wide-ranging intervention.  
Turning first to the deontological argument, if we recognise something as so good for 
its own sake, it does not matter at what level it is regulated. In such cases, the argu-
ment is for universal regulation and EU law becomes simply an institutional expres-
sion of cosmopolitan values. Arguments surrounding Union or European regulation 
of abortion, holocaust denial or hate speech often seem to be underpinned by this.93  
One difficulty is what happens if a party disputes the presence of the good or the 
basis on which it is justified as a good.94 An even more substantive difficulty is that 
the programming facilities of cosmopolitanism are very thin. It does not extend to 
                                                        
92 D. Chalmers, supra n.1,  178-183. 
93 See the notion of European Union demokratia promoted by T. Garton Ash, ‘We need a benign 
European hydra to advance the cause of democracy’ Guardian, 17 April 2008. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/apr/17/eu.usa On a pan-European right to 
abortion see Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, ‘Access to safe and legal abortion’ 
Resolution 1607 (2008)  
http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta08/ERES1607.htm#1  
94 On the European Union criminalising holocaust denial, the British Daily Telegraph stated, 
‘People who question the official history of recent conflicts in Africa and the Balkans could be 
jailed for up to three years for "genocide denial", under proposed EU legislation...’ B. Waterfield, ‘ 
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defining the limit or ways or means of realising a good. It cannot set procedures for 
termination of a foetus or a complete definition of hate speech or denial. 
The other argument is premised on a good only acquiring normative status upon 
awareness of it as a good. A goal of law is therefore enquiry into what is good for us 
to do. In this, EU law may have advantages over other legal processes in this form of 
enquiry. Variations of this argument have been found in EU equal opportunities law 
where authors have argued that EU law has been able to develop a more progressive 
agenda than its national counterparts because the Court of Justice offers an arena for 
marginalised interests to escape the hegemony and capture of domestic institutions 
by regressive majorities or elites.95 Unhappy with these institutions and unable to 
obtain sufficient voice there, these interests have been able to use the Court to 
express arguments that were otherwise pushed aside. There has thus been a freer 
market of ideas less dominated by entrenched interests before the Court of Justice in 
these fields. 
There is something in this, but this argument creates the conditions for its own 
demise. Its starting point is that there is uncertainty surrounding what we know as 
good. We cannot know whether basing levels of pay on length of service is bad 
because it discriminates against women so EU law is to take a determinative 
judgment on this as other venues are suspect.96 As the example shows, it assumes not 
only high contestation surrounding any judgment but also an element of normative 
absence. We are not sure of the reasons for action one way or another. Alongside 
this, the argument is a consequentialist one as it is based on the idea of something as 
good when we are confident of its consequences – it will lead to good things. Yet a 
body as remote as the Court of Justice from the heterogeneity surrounding the lives 
of half a billion people simply cannot know whether it is good for all of them or how 
it is good for them. Whatever the substantive merits of this argument, it begets a 
                                                        
95 From different traditions see M. Poiares Maduro, We, the court: The European Court of Justice & 
the European Economic Constitution (1998, Hart, Oxford) 166-174; K. Alter, ‘The European 
Union’s Legal System and Domestic Policy: Spillover or Backlash?’ (2000) 54 International 
Organization 489. 
96 Case C-17/05 Cadman v HSE [2006] ECR 9583. 





level of political contestation which suggests that EU law can only be deployed 
occasionally for this purpose. 
 
4.2. The Unfair Distribution of Entitlements 
The entitlements are not just narrowly confined but their distribution generates 
significant asymmetries. If the CCS proposal imposes significant responsibilities and 
costs on the operators of twelve installations, it also empowers them. Carbon 
Capture storage is estimated at having the potential to reduce the cost of stabilising 
CO2 emissions by 30%  - an astronomical value in any emissions trading scheme.97 
The effects on the structure of the energy market are significant. The costs of the 
technology are high and they therefore push towards development of larger coal-
fired power plants because of the economies of the scale of the latter. All this 
suggests a considerable concentration of industrial power.98 With regard to the FI 
proposal, research suggests that labels are far more likely to be read by those of ‘ 
high educational achievement’ who were women and lived in smaller households.99 
Whilst the PR proposal is adamant that that health care should be distributed on the 
basis of equity, universality and solidarity,100 a new test is introduced – that of non-
discrimination on nationality and respect for free movement.101 It is a curious notion 
of non-discrimination, however. For it can only invoked by patients who move for 
care from one State to another.102 There are no entitlements in the proposal for 
patients in the State of affiliation to require the same level of treatment as those who 
are moving. Nor is there any for those in the Member State of treatment to require 
the same level of care as mobile patients from other Member States. It is a legal 
entitlement just given to mobile patients. There is not only a differentiation in legal 
                                                        
97 On this see IPPC Special Report, Carbon Capture and Storage: A Special Report of Working Group 
III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2005, CUP, Cambridge) 12. 
98  Ibid., 344 etseq. 
99 A summary of the research has been provided by the Foods Standards Agency, Review and 
analysis of current literature on consumer understanding of nutrition and health claims made on 
food (2007, FSA, London)  
http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/healthclaims.pdf  
100 PR proposal, Preamble, alinea. 12 
101 Ibid, Preamble, alinea 12.  
102 Ibid., article 5(1)(g). 
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entitlements between those who have the same ailment, but, perhaps more im-
portantly, a significant asymmetry emerges between patients with different types of 
condition. Those with a condition which requires specialised treatment but allows 
mobility are privileged vis-à-vis patients with other conditions. The former can 
demand resources to be spent on them, in particular access to specialised care in a 
way that is not available to other conditions and in a way that will be at the expense 
of the resources deployed on the latter.  
How could this be so? It goes to the restricted imaginary of justice in the eudaimonia 
of EU law. Conceived around formalistic notions of interdependence, it lacks the 
scale of vision to countenance different styles of claim. There is thus no vision of 
public health which allows the different claims of different conditions and their 
treatments to be evaluated against one another. This restriction is not just one of 
range but also one of affect. Put simply EU law lacks an affective capacity which 
would enable it to gauge the value of treating one versus the value of treating 
another. 
 
4.3. Subjection to Unimaginable Risks  
A feature of all three proposals is that the risks in question are incalculable. If a 
feature of traditional risks is that they are seen as managed uncertainties whose 
incidence can be subjected to some form of calculation, many of the dangers 
regulated by EU law sit at the penumbra of this spectrum of calculation. It is not that 
they are necessarily more remote but they are particularly difficult to assess in any 
meaningful way.  
With regard to the CCS proposal, there is almost no basis by which to gauge the 
economic and ecological risks of the technology. Current estimates on the financial 
cost of carbon capture and storage are linked to the costs of surveying the territory in 
question and those of pumping and transporting the CO2.  The costs of monitoring 
the site, post-closure obligations and remediation of any leak are impossible to tell. 





There is then the imponderable of how much of this can be passed on to the 
customer. The ecological risks are even more uncertain. There are concerns that 
storage can increase the possibility of earthquakes and that leakage can lead to mass 
poisoning of the surrounding landscape. It is also uncertain how responsibility can 
be ascribed given the ubiquitous presence of CO2 in the atmosphere. These 
ecological risks are considered remote but it is acknowledged ‘there is limited ex-
perience with geological storage, closely related industrial experience and scientific 
knowledge could serve as a basis for appropriate risk management.’103 In other 
words, there is an element of speculation about the process because it is 
unprecedented and one has to proceed on the basis of apparently analogous 
processes. This was reflected in the Commission’s consultation in which there was an 
extremely high  proportion of ‘don’t knows’ with parties unable to comment on the 
levels of ecological risk.104 There is, consequently, increased emphasis on procedure. 
The CO2 stream must be kept as pure as possible and registers must be kept of the 
qualities and quantities of the CO2 streams.105 She is responsible for monitoring the 
injection facilities, storage complex and surrounding environment for leakages or 
adverse ecological effects.106 There must be regular reports to the authorities107 and, in 
cases of significant irregularities or leakages, corrective measures must be taken.108 
These obligations all continue after closure of the site.109 
The risks associated with the PR proposal derive from the patient being treated in 
another Member State. There is an issue of continuity of care. How is after-care 
provided or follow-up treatment? The proposal has little to say on this but  focuses 
on other dangers, namely lack of familiarity with the foreign health system and 
commensurability of health care standards across the different national systems. On 
the former national contact points are to be established for cross-border health care. 
These are, inter alia, to provide patients with information on their rights and 
                                                        
103 IPPC supra n..., 13. 
104 ICF International, Analysis and Interpretation of responses from the CCS consultation (Sept 
2007, Brussels) 10-12.  
105 CCS proposal, article 12. 
106 Ibid., article 13. 
107 Ibid., article 14. 
108 Ibid., article 16. 
109 Ibid., article 17(2). 
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guarantees of quality and safety as well as helping to protect their rights and obtain 
out of court settlements where called for.110 To secure commensurability of health 
care standards, European reference networks are to be put in place which promote 
not only cooperation between health care provider and maximise cost-effectiveness, 
but which also share knowledge and provide quality and safety benchmarks 
spreading best practice.111 Combined, these networks created integrated reference 
points for the provision and allocation of health care in the European Union. 
Allocation is to take place through coordination and specialisation. More broadly, 
they are also to change how health care is provided through enabling synergies 
between providers and the development of common approaches and methodologies, 
and these might be the most wide-ranging effects of the proposal. 
 A similar style of risk is found in the FI proposal. The central amendment is to 
provide labelling information on the nutritional qualities of food. All food must 
contain a nutrition declaration which provides information about the amounts of 
energy, fats, saturates and carbohydrates with specific reference to sugar and salt.112 
It may also include details on the amount of other nutrients which include protein, 
fibre, vitamins, transfats and mono- or poly-unsaturates.113 A feature of nutrition is 
that it is the provision of cells, material and organisms to support life. A feature of 
almost all nutrients, and certainly all the ones on the mandatory list, is that none are 
bad or good per se. The problem arises if there is a deficiency or an excess. Nutritional 
science is notoriously inexact, therefore, as it must always look at the state of a body 
before and after the consumption of nutrients over a significant period during which 
a lot of other variables will come into play. Whilst there is of course evidence of poor 
nutrition, it is measured in outcomes, such as 30% of the EU population being 
overweight in 2006.114 The EU strategy on nutrition is therefore one based on 
precautionary politics. No food is banned because of its nutritional qualities on the 
grounds that the ex ante risk of excess is too great. Instead, individuals are encou-
                                                        
110 Ibid., article 12(2). 
111 Ibid,. Article 15(2). 
112 FI proposal, article 9(1)(l) & article 29(1). 
113 Ibid., article 29(2). 
114 EC Commission, White Paper on A Strategy for Europe on Nutrition, Overweight and Obesity 
Related Health Issues, COM (2007) 279, 2. 





raged to make healthy life style choices which integrate nutritional balance into this. 
Labelling has therefore become central to this strategy. If the FI proposal is about 
enabling individuals to make ‘informed choices’ by setting out the nutritional 
qualities of food, alongside it the Union has been eager to prevent manipulation of 
their choices by food providers, so we also find legislation not requiring the insertion 
of information but regulating the type of health or nutrition claims that may be made 
about food.115  
The reasons for the management of this particular quality of risk lie in the European 
Union being concerned with the extension of eudaimonia. It does not reinvent the idea 
of a better life but aims to augment existing possibilities and understandings.  This 
extension of opportunities is most obvious where it happens spatially. The PR pro-
posal does not establish for the first time the idea of individual access to public 
health care but transnationalises that right by making it an entitlement that stretches 
across a broader territory with a wider range of providers and types of provision. Yet 
eudaimonia stretches EU law in a more profound sense. As stated earlier,  its ambition 
requires EU law to enable us not only to do things would not otherwise be possible 
but to do them in a better way. This creates a particular relationship between EU law 
and risk. On the one hand, EU law is concerned to let us dare to do more things.116 It 
enables us to experiment with biotechnology, complex financial markets, climate 
change, mass harvesting of fish stocks, diverse patterns of regulatory control such as 
mutual recognition precisely because it is confident of its capacity to manage these 
things. On the other, it is concerned to manage these dangers more effectively than 
other regimes. The justification for EU regulation is that it can avert dangers that 
national authorities cannot. Once again, this is not simply a question of scale but of 
regulatory capacity and disposition. Commitments are thus made to high levels of 
safety and regulation. 117 Furthermore, the EU is to regulate those risks over which 
there are doubts about individual national capacity either because there is mistrust 
                                                        
115 Regulation 1924/2006 on nutrition and health claims made on foods, OJ 2007, L 12/3.  
116 Risk is said therefore to derive from risicare from the Italian word to dare. On the 
development of the term see P. Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk (1996, 
John Wiley, New York) especially Chapters 6-11.  
117 The strongest statement is in Article 95(3) EC which commits EU market regulation to a high 
level of health safety, environmental protection and consumer protection. 
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between regulators to realise this effectively or because the incidence, nature or scale 
of the risk is seen as particularly challenging to gauge. This is reflected in the insti-
tutional features of EU law. Mutual mistrust between regulators has led to a system 
where national regulators seek high guarantees from EU law which often go to 
inspection and certification.118 A parallel process has emerged in situations, such as 
pharmaceuticals, food safety and chemicals, where a European agency is set up to 
consider questions of market access. There is invariably provision for consultation of 
national regulators with the consequence that the agency acts as a meeting point for 
multiple regulators to reach a consensus and to verify each other’s arguments.119  
Substantively, this leads to EU law engaging with a particular style of activity in a 
particular way. EU law is granted guardianship over the most challenging form of 
risk because it claims a superior power of management. This power is justified in a 
claim to possess a better awareness of risk. This claim is founded partly on the 
authority of expertise – the use of multiple regulators – but it is also founded upon a 
claim to regulatory assurance in which the limits of scientific knowledge are 
perfectly understood. It is this which leads EU law to claim that it can regulate 
dangers whose parameters science or expertise does not fully understand or know. 
The most salient exposition of this is the prevalence of the precautionary principle in 
EU law, which allows for regulatory protection if the possibility of harm has been 
identified even if widespread scientific uncertainty persists.120 A feature of this 
                                                        
118 The point has been made by Majone with regard to the evolution of insurance and 
pharmaceuticals regulation. G. Majone, Mutual Trust, Credible Commitments and the Evolution of 
the Rules of the Single Market (EUI Working Paper RSC 95/1, EUI, Fiesole). An equally strong case 
is the Whole Vehicle Type Approval process for the car market where since the early 1970s 
regulatory authorities have been required to comply with detailed testing and approval models. 
The process has been recast in Directive 2007/46 establishing a framework for the approval of 
motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, components and separate technical units 
intended for such vehicles, OJ 2007, L 263/1. 
119 This is formalised in duties upon Community agencies to resolve differences with and, in 
certain circumstances, liaise with national counterparts. Regulation 178/2002/EC establishing 
general principles for food safety and a European Food Safety Authority, OJ 2002, L 31/1, articles 
22(7) & 30; Regulation 726/2004/EC laying down Community procedures for the authorisation 
and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European 
Medicines Agency,  OJ 2004, L 136/1, articles 47, 50 & 59(4); Regulation 1907/2006 concerning 
the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a 
European Chemicals Agency, OJ 2007 L 136/3, article 85(5) & 6(6). 
120 The literature is extensive but a particularly fine recent review is E. Fischer, ‘Opening 
Pandora’s box: contextualising the precautionary principle in the European Union’ in M Everson 
& E. Vos (eds) Uncertain Risks Regulated (2009, Routledge-Cavendish, Abingdon).  





principle and analogous logics is that they are concerned not so much with gauging 
danger as managing the anxiety that arises from the failure to be able to do the 
former in a sufficiently compelling way. The principle allows recourse to heuristic 
and rule of thumb techniques on the grounds that expertise cannot provide the 
answer.121  Yet what to do when having relied on expertise to secure jurisdiction, EU 
law rejects a priori the quest for scientific evidence as a model for decision-making?122 
Some have argued this space provides an opportunity for political participation123 
whilst others have decried the administrative freedom allowed by it.124 Either 
political scenario is confronted with a context, however, which is the opposite to that 
promised. The promise of being allowed to do more things more safely is replaced 
by a reality of decision-makers and public having to confront unimaginable risks - 
dangers that cannot be fully gauged and for which only partial reassurances and 
incomplete normative structures can be offered. This is no longer a reassuring world 
but one in which law institutes anxiety and a counter-impulse to do nothing.125 
 
4.4. The Responsibilities of the European Subject 
These risks fall on EU legal subjects. One style of risk is borne by those responsible 
for managing the quality of the operation – the providers of food or hospital services 
and the operators of carbon capture storage facilities. The other bearers of risks – the 
patient, the consumer, the public affected by carbon dioxide escape – are those 
required to adopt precautionary life strategies taking into account the risk to which 
they are being exposed.  
                                                        
121 K. Haggerty, “From Risk to Precaution: The Rationalities of Crime Prevention” 193, 194-195 in 
R. Ericson & A. Doyle (eds) Risk and Morality (2003, University of Toronto Press, Toronto).  
122 C. Joerges, ‘Sound Science in the European and global market: Karl Polanyi in Geneva’ 415, 420 
in M Everson & E. Vos (eds) Uncertain Risks Regulated (2009, Routledge-Cavendish, Abingdon). 
123 J.Scott & S. Sturm, ‘Courts as Catalysts: Rethinking the Judicial Role in New Governance’ 
(2007) 13 CJEL 565. 
124 V. Heyvaert, 'Facing the Consequences of the Precautionary Principle in European Community 
Law' (2006) 31 E LRev 185. 
125 On the politics of anxiety see D. Chalmers, ‘Risk, Anxiety and the European Mediation of the 
Politics of Life’ (2005) 30 European Law Review 649, 663-674. 
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The levels of responsibility for the former are high in all three proposals. The CCS 
proposal imposes strong duties on site selection. The geological formation must be 
such that there is no significant risk of leakage or significant negative environmental 
or health impacts are likely to occur.126 Similar duties apply to management of the 
stream. The operator must ensure concentrations of substances other than CO2 do 
not affect the integrity of the site or pose a significant risk to the environment.127 The 
operator is strictly liable for any environmental damage that occurs, irrespective of 
compliance with the Directive.128 In like ilk, the PR proposal imposes new duties on 
providers of health services. There is intended to be a levelling up of quality so 
Member State must create mechanisms to ensure compliance with recognised good 
medical practice. There must be monitoring and corrective action where this does not 
happen.129 There must be systems of compensation and professional liability 
insurance schemes.130  The standard of care in the FI proposal is also significant. 
Mandatory labelling has been introduced for more than nine nutrients (something 
estimated to be between seven to eleven times more costly than for three nutrients)131 
and minimum font sizes for all labels have been introduced to aid legibility – 
something also acknowledged as introducing significant extra cost for all industry.132 
There a strict responsibility for this on all operators who place food  on the market 
for the first time.133 Yet there is also a responsibility on operators engaged in retail 
and distribution activities which do not affect food information to take due care to 
ensure that the requirements are met.134 The regime is sufficient onerous that there is 
a dispensation for five years from the nutrition elements for SMEs.135 
                                                        
126 CCS proposal, article 4(2). 
127 Ibid., article 12. 
128 Ibid., article 33. 
129 PR proposal, articles 5(1)(a) & (b). 
130 Ibid., articles 5(1)(d) & (e). 
131 FI proposal, article 29 & Annex VI. See EC Commission, Impact Assessment Report on General 
Food Labelling Issues, SEC (2008) 92, 86. 
132 Ibid., article 14(1). It will necessitate the redesign of 97% of all  labels and the costs were 
estimated in the impact assessment at possibly €5.2billion. Ibid., 43.  
133 FI proposal, article 8(3). 
134 Ibid., article 8(4). 
135 Ibid., article 53. 





If the levels of regulatory responsibility are high, the precautionary qualities of EU 
law add a twist by suggesting these can only ever be discharged in a partial way. 136 
Dissatisfaction with orthodox calculative reasoning leads to recourse to multiple 
sources of validation in precautionary reasoning. The synthesis of these leads, in 
turn, to overall rule of thumb assessments beset by an element of contingency. In the 
CCS proposal, for example, as it is impossible for the operator to monitor the storage 
site itself for leakage, she is confined to monitoring the complex, the injection 
facilities and the surrounding environment in the hope that these will somehow 
provide indicative signs.137 In the PR proposal, recourse to public funded treatment 
abroad will be had when sufficiently satisfactory specialised treatment is not 
available in the home State. This involves heuristic judgments by the specialist with 
the patient about the quality of treatment in the other hospital, the quality of the 
after-care, the availability of substitute treatment in the home State. With regard to 
the question of nutrition labelling in the FI proposal, it is not simply a question of fat 
and salt being bad and fibre being good. In all cases,  labels have to be read in the 
light of the life style of the consumer – a process that is inevitable situated and highly 
personalised to that consumer – and something that the retailer or food processor 
cannot advise on.   
This leads EU law to adopt a Janus-faced approach to those exposed to risk by these 
operations. On the one hand, these are the subjects of EU law whose lives it seeks to 
better. In this regard, it deliver goods to them but, above all, opportunities for them 
to better their lives as it sees it and to realise the European eudaimonia. On the other 
hand, EU law is concerned with the effective management of risk. The understanding 
that the operators of risk activities cannot be insurers of risk leads to it ask its 
subjects to develop individual risk strategies. This development of opportunity and 
management of risk are brought together in all three proposals through the provision 
of information to subjects so that they can orient their lives. This is most obvious 
with the FI proposal and the details it requires of food labels, but the PR proposal 
                                                        
136 On the qualities of this logic see B. Hebenton & T. Seddon, ‘From Dangerousness to Precaution: 
Managing Sexual and Violent Offenders in an Insecure and Violent Age’ (2009) 49 British Journal 
of Criminology (forthcoming). 
137 CCS proposal, article 13(1). 
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provides for the provision of information to enable patients to make informed 
choices about their treatment about their health care, including details on prices, out-
comes, and liability coverage138  by both the health care provider and through 
national contact points.139 The CCS proposal provides, through incorporating the 
requirements of the integrated pollution prevention control and environmental 
impact assessment, that the public be consulted on the establishment of any instal-
lations or pipelines.140 This right to be informed, on its face, is an entitlement 
enabling involvement and more aware life choices. Yet, in all cases,  the exercise of 
this entitlement is not self-evident. It only makes sense to insist on consultation over 
carbon capture and storage if one is going to be actively involved in debate about the 
process. Similarly, acquiring information about treatment abroad involves a choice 
about two-centre treatment and questions of after-care that are not easy to resolve. 
Reading labels about nutrition is only meaningful if it contributes to leading an 
active and healthy life - something that is very challenging to do! Of course, 
individuals are free not to do this, but then they are simply disenfranchised. The 
legislation offers either no benefit to them or it is something to which they are simply 
exposed in some passive sense. In short, benefits are contingent on the exercise of 
significant responsibilities.  
There is a strong paradox . EU law seeks to secure EU subjects a better life that is 
more effectively governed. The invocation of this better life leads it not only to 
expose its subjects to barely comprehensible dangers. It also creates asymmetries of 
power in which these dangers are created and governed for them by domineering 
processes – be it the energy operators in carbon capture and storage, health experts 
in the case of patients or the food industry in the case of labelling – which can 
provide only incomplete assurances about the dangers involved. Onerous duties are 
then placed on the subjects both to enable a better life for themselves and to deal 
with this absence of reassurance. Such a process, whatever its more diffuse benefits, 
lends itself to anomie and alienation. 
                                                        
138 PR proposal, article 5(1)(c). 
139 PR proposal, articles 5(1)(c) & 12(1). 
140 CCS proposal, articles 29 & 30. 





5. Conclusion  
An idea of self-betterment constitutes the cumbersomeness of EU law. Yet the idea of 
self-betterment is also central to the modern conception of the human condition and 
to government. And, indeed, if the EU were not there we would almost certainly 
reinvent equivalent processes to better ourselves. Yet, driven unrelentingly forward, 
self-betterment can become a pathology simultaneously making harsh demands  and 
being blind to its costs. That is the danger for EU law. For it makes a number of harsh 
demands. 
First, it drives its subjects on only to tell them they have never done sufficient. 
Secondly, if the benefits of EU law may at times be considerable (e.g. a clean 
environment) they are also diffused and hidden as collective goods. By contrast, 
direct entitlements are granted only occasionally as EU law will only provide these 
where others cannot provide them. Meanwhile, the justice behind the arrangements 
is uneven and the politics poorly mediated. Thirdly, if the entitlements granted by 
EU law are few, the range, incidence and nature of responsibilities are considerable, 
driven by the impulse to make us lead better lives and to regulate ever more 
activities ever more effectively. EU law creates therefore a law of fear in which 
through enabling us to do more, it also exposes us to more consequences, but 
provides limited assurances about the anxieties provoked and an insouciance about 
the sense of constraint it induces in the individual in the management of the 
entitlements and responsibilities established.   
How to take this forward? The paper is at an end but other writers who have written 
more generally about these conditions indicate two routes that will only be touched 
upon. In his work, Sen argues for the notion of freedom over that of well-being 
because it incorporates the idea of process as central to realisation of a good life.141 By 
this, he is not referring to ideas about the public sphere but to the more intimate 
notion that individual ownership and praxis is vital to defining rather than just 
enjoying the good things in life. Others have talked about processes in which 
                                                        
141 A. Sen, Rationality and Freedom (2002, Harvard University Press, Cambridge) 585-587. 
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individuals are given more leeway to give an account of their own lives as whilst 
such accounts may only be partial and contingent they are the central medium 
through which we bind ourselves to others.142 Surely this would call for more leeway 
from EU law in allowing us to define ‘better’ lives for ourselves and whether we 
want such lives. Alongside this, Fromm has famously talked about the fear of 
freedom in which individuals demanded to lead lives that they feel are their own 
seek a number of false gods – be these comforting symbols of authoritarianism, the 
approval of others in material or political conformism or wanton destructiveness of 
the self or others.143 Are these not many of the associations which arise in response to 
the claims of EU law? If so,  this suggests that, irrespective of what is a better life, EU 
law must consider seriously what it demands subjects sacrifice of themselves in the 
collective pursuit of the distant horizon of betterment. And maybe what EU law 
needs to concern itself with is not its betterment or its reform but the conditions 














                                                        
142 J.Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself (2005, Fordham University Press, New York) 30-40. 
143 E. Fromm, Fear of Freedom (1942, Ark, London) Chapter V. 
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